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Law Summary
Eulogies, Effigies, & Erroneous
Interpretations: Comparing Missouri's
Child Protection System to Federal Law
I. INTRODUCTION
As you know, today the public child welfare system sees more
children than ever who are in crisis. This increase is threatening to
overwhelm our ability to make a positive difference in the lives of
troubled children and their families.... We recognize that more needs
to be done to improve and strengthen the child welfare system and that
state agencies cannot do it alone.'
Societal views regarding the status and rights of children and the duty of
states to provide for their welfare and protection have evolved significantly over
the past several decades. Children, once seen as property of their parents, now
are recognized to have constitutional rights that essentially mirror those of
adults.2 Additionally, federal and state courts have recognized that parents have
constitutionally protected rights to raise their children free from undue
interference by the states
Balancing the rights of parents with the rights of
children in their care has proven to be difficult, though necessary, in the
evolution of a society that recognizes the importance of a safe and stable
environment for children as they mature into adulthood.

1. On Behalf ofthe American Public Welfare Association Before the Subcomm. on
Social Security and Family Policy Comm. on Finance, U.S. Senate on Child Welfare
Reform, 105th Cong. (May 21, 1997) (statement of Gary J. Stangler, Director of the
Missouri Department of Social Services), available at 1997 WL 1057202 1.
2. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
(stating that "[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer
and Pierce and the Child as Propery, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1042-46 (1992)
(providing an overview of children as parental property).
3. See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down
a statute as an unconstitutional interference with parental ability to direct "the upbringing
and education of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (recognizing a parent's due process liberty interest in establishing a home and
bringing up children); In re K.A.W., No.SC 85683, 2004 WL 616342, at *7 (Mo. Mar.
30, 2004) (en banc) (stating "[a) parent's right to raise her children is a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the constitutional guarantee of due process.").
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Gary Stangler, former Director of the Missouri Department of Social
Services, offered the statement at the beginning of this Law Summary in support
of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA"). 4 ASFA aimed
to improve the child welfare scheme while providing incentives for states to
increase the likelihood of a permanent home for foster children.5 This Law
Summary addresses the legislative history leading up to the current federal child
welfare legislation, corresponding Missouri statutes enacted or amended to
comply with federal law, and notable court decisions that affect the state's child
protection system.
Due to a number of factors, state courts and child protection agencies are
diluting the purposes of ASFA. State agencies and courts that deal with child
welfare are faced with serious budget constraints, overwhelming caseloads, and
varying judicial interpretations of state statutes." While efforts to implement
child protection systems struggle in many respects, state courts further injure the
systems by contravening legislative intent through statutory interpretations.
Recent developments within Missouri threaten to degrade the intent of ASFA
and could cause further harm to a system that, while well-intentioned and
supported by a laudable legislative scheme, continues to decay.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The current state and federal legislation aimed at child protection is still in
its infancy, emerging in recent years due to increased social and political pressure
to provide permanent homes for the increasing number of children that were
placed in foster care due to abuse or neglect. Although the first juvenile court
systems in America began near the beginning of the twentieth century,7 attention
to the plight of abused and neglected children did not become an issue of
mainstream importance until professional associations began disseminating
information on reports of "battered child syndrome."8 Media attention to these
reports garnered public concern and support for legislation aimed at the
prevention and detection of child abuse and neglect.9 This Part reviews prior

4. See supranote Iand accompanying text.
5. Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 603,613,622, 629, 645,653,671-72, 673(b), 67475, 677-78, 679(b), 901, 1305, 1320, 5113 (1998)).
6. See infra Part IV.
7.

DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW:

DOCTRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE 1057-58 (2d ed. 2003).
8. See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-ChildSyndrome, 181 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 17 (1962). This influential medical report discussed characteristics of injuries
inflicted on battered children, linking the trauma to abuse and neglect by parents. Id. at
17-18.
9. See ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 287.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/8
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legislation that led to ASFA, the impact that legislation had on children and child
protection systems, the policies underlying ASFA, and the problems it was
intended to correct.' 0
A. Early Legislation
In 1935, Congress established Titles IV-A and TV-B of the Social Security
Act." These amendments to the original Social Security Act gave limited
funding for state social services to assist impoverished families. 2 Subsequent
amendments to the Social Security Act channeled federal funds toward states to
allow maintenance payments for children in foster care and to provide for abuse
and neglect prevention and treatment programs. 3 This funding also assisted
states with adoption services."' Although federal funding increased over time,
states retained a large amount of discretion over the child welfare laws and the
manner in which state employees implemented those laws. 5
Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974
("CAPTA") to help states establish standards for identifying and reporting child
mistreatment and to fund state child abuse and neglect reporting systems. 6 To
receive the funds, states were required to establish statutes that created a central
registry to receive reports of child abuse and neglect, while allowing immunity
for persons who reported allegations.' 7 States were also required to create laws
that provided immediate help to children that were the subject of substantiated
reports.'" CAPTA also created the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect,
which provided training materials and assistance to child protection agencies.' 9
While most states had already implemented reporting laws prior to the enactment
of CAPTA, the federal legislation expanded the types of mistreatment that should
be reported if states wished to receive federal funding.20 Although the federal

10. For a general description of steps followed within state child protection
systems, including the interaction between state child protection agencies, juvenile
offices and other parties, see id. at 309, Figure 4-3.

11. See Social Security Act § 521, Pub. L. No. 74-271,49 Stat. 620 (1935) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679(a) (2000)).
12. See Social Security Act Amendments §§ 2-7, Pub. L. No. 87-31, 75 Stat. 75,
76-78 (1961); ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 289.
13. See ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 289.
14. Id. at 290.
15. Robert M.Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The PromiseandFailureof
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REv. 637, 642-43 (1999).
16. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4, 5 (1974).
17. Id. at 6-7.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 5.
20. See ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 291. The Child Abuse Prevention,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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legislation provides some standards for defining and reporting abuse, state laws
vary.2" States differ as to who is required to report, what should be reported, and
what types of sanctions are available if a "mandatory reporter" does not report
suspicions of child abuse or neglect. 2 This legislation and the incentives for
states to comply heralded the start of federal review of state efforts to prevent and
treat child abuse.

B. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
For several reasons the amendments to the Social Security Act and CAPTA
did not lead to the results that Congress desired. Although Congress authorized
some funding for states that complied with prior federal mandates, most states
funded their child protection systems almost entirely on their own and were
struggling financially.23 The federal government also failed to carefully monitor
state programs, causing states not to receive millions of dollars for which they
were otherwise authorized.24 States struggled to manage the costs of foster care,
and used the limited federal money almost entirely to supplement the costs of
foster care and adoption subsidies rather than on services to enable potential
family reunification.2" Children languished in foster care without finding

Adoption and Family Services Act of 1988 further expanded the definition of
maltreatment as 'the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, negligent
treatment, or maltreatment of a child by a person who is responsible for the child's
welfare, under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed
or threatened."' Id.; see Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption and Family Services Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-294, 102 Stat. 102 (1988) (current version at42 U.S.C. §§ 5106ah, 10413 (2000)).
21. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 7, at 291.
22. Id. A "mandatory reporter" is generally a member of a certain profession that
has access to children and would be in a good position to recognize abuse, such as a

teacher, doctor, or social worker. Id.
23. See S. REP. No. 96-336, at 1 (1979), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448,
1450.

24. Id. at 1449. Pursuant to ASFA provisions, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, working together with state governors, legislatures, and other public officials,
is required to create a system to rate states' compliance with the federal mandates and
annually submit a report to Congress regarding states' performances. 42 U.S.C. § 679b
(1997).
25. See Alice C. Shotton, Making ReasonableEfforts in Child Abuse andNeglect
Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 224 (1990) ("While lost in a system

that could neither return them to their families nor place them with adoptive parents,
these children often moved from foster home to foster home, becoming more and more
disturbed with each move.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/8
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permanent homes, and eventually Congress recognized the detriment to children
that lacked a stable and permanent living situation.26
In response to these problems, Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("AACWA").27 The legislation aimed to
encourage states to find permanent homes for children and to reduce the number
of children in foster care. 2' AACWA continued to provide funds for foster care
maintenance, but also offered financial support for family reunification services.29
To receive AACWA funding, states were required to comply with several
provisions and have a plan for services approved by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services. a° States were required to maintain case plans for every child
in their care, and were mandated to establish a case review system setting specific
deadlines for judicial or administrative reviews."a Legislators intended for the
review system to quicken the pace of decisions regarding permanent placement
for children, thereby reducing the time spent in foster care.32 Congress required
the state to present a plan containing provisions that mandated child protection
workers to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent the child's removal from his or
her home, and after removal, to make "reasonable efforts" toward family
reunification.

33

The two-pronged "reasonable efforts" requirement, while supported by
practical legislative purposes, was not defined. The states had discretion to
determine what efforts were reasonable; unfortunately, the results were contrary
to the policies underlying the Act. 34 The number of children in foster care

increased after the enactment of AACWA, as more children entered the child
protection system yearly than exited.35 Soon it became clear that the "reasonable
efforts" requirement was being interpreted by state child protection workers as
giving priority to services for family reunification rather than to childrens' need

26. S. REP. No. 96-336 (1979), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1459; see
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 836 n.37 (1977)
(highlighting the growing concern that children remained in foster care for increasing
lengths of time, and that this seriously damaged the children's development).
27. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272,94 Stat. 500,
502 (1980) (codified in scattered Sections of 42 U.S.C.).
28. S.REP.No. 96-336, at 12 (1979), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448,1461.
29. 45 C.F.R. § 1357.15(e)(2) (1995) (superceded). Services included daycare,
vocational rehabilitation, and counseling. Id. However, nothing in the requirements
mandated that a state provide such services.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (Supp. III 1991).

31. Id. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(1).
32. H.R. REP. No. 96-136, at 11 (1979).

33. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (Supp. III 1991).
34. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
35. Mary O'Flynn, The Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct of 1997: Changing Child
Welfare Policy Without Addressing ParentalSubstanceAbuse, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 243, 254 (1999).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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for a permanent home.36 Child protection workers were leaving children in
unsafe homes, leading to large amounts of media attention over child deaths at
the hands of their parents." Additionally, workers were leaving children in foster
care for years while continuing to provide services to the parents to attempt
reunification, even in situations where the parents committed chronic or severe
acts of abuse or when parents made little or no progress in remedying potentially
harmful situations to children.3" Cases of child deaths occurring in foster care
also began to receive intense media coverage.39 Pressure increased to enact clear
legislation that would result in permanency for children within shorter time

frames.

C. The Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct
Enactment of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997' was
widely supported across political party lines and heralded by some commentators
as providing hope for a "revolution" in foster care.4 ASFA attempted to address
many of the concerns that arose from prior federal legislation. In order to clear
up the vagueness of the "reasonable efforts" requirement of AACWA, ASFA
provides that when states offer reasonable efforts to families in order to prevent
removal of children or to facilitate family reunification, "the child's health and

36. See Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State's
Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 273
(2003).
37. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193
(1989); Nina Bernstein & Frank Bruni, She Suffered in Plain Sight But Alarms Were
Ignored,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1995, at 1, 22.
38. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: STATE EFFORTS TO
IMPROVE THE PERMANENCY PLANNING PROCESS SHOW SOME PROMISE 15 (1997),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97073.pdf; U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., Adoption 2002: A Response to the PresidentialExecutive Memorandum
on Adoption Issued December 14, 1996, availableat http://www.profane-justice.org/Su
z_Personal/ForcedAdoption/forced-adoption.html.
39. See Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility Reviews and Child and Family Services
State Plan Reviews, 63 Fed. Reg. 50,061 (proposed Sept. 18, 1998) (blaming
misinterpretations of the reasonable efforts requirement as the cause of several foster
child deaths).
40. Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 603,613,622,629,645,653,671-72,673(b), 67475, 677-78, 679(b), 901, 1305, 1320, & 5113 (1998)).
41. R. Bruce Dold, GivingKids a Little More Wiggle Room, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12,
1997, at 27. Mr. Dold also stated that "the law will no longer let kids languish forever
in foster care while social workers treat their misfit parents as victims. This is what those
of us who have been complaining about the system have been looking for." Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/8
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safety shall be the paramount concern.
Therefore, reasonable efforts to
prevent removal or facilitate reunification are not always required, such as in
extreme abuse situations or when the custodial parent's rights to another child
have been terminated.43 However, as at least one commentator on ASFA
recognized, states must provide proper services to families for reasonable efforts
to work."
Other provisions of ASFA focus on reducing the time children spend in
' A permanency hearing
foster care by requiring "permanency hearings."45
must
be held within thirty days after a child is taken into state custody and again after
the child has been in state custody for twelve months.' ASFA also eliminates
temporary foster care as an option during dispositional hearings, which determine
where the child will reside; the states are required to determine if the child will
be returned to the parent, placed for adoption pending termination of parental
rights, or referred for legal guardianship.47 ASFA promotes the possibility of
foster child adoption by requiring states to recruit qualified adoptive families and
by providing monetary incentives to states that are able to increase adoptions
above pre-ASFA levels.48
An important feature of ASFA is that it requires state child protection
agencies to file a court petition for termination of parental rights ("TPR") in
certain situations.49 ASFA requires that the juvenile office file a TPR petition in
cases where the child has remained in foster care for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months."0 This provision, coupled with the requirement of a

42. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(1 5)(A) (Supp. IV 1998). In Subpart B, however, the exact

language of AACWA is retained. Id. § 671 (a)(1 5)(B). See Christine H.Kim, Puttingthe
Reason Back into ReasonableEfforts Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (Supp. IV 1998). For instance, if parents have

committed crimes against their children such as murder, voluntary manslaughter, or
felony assault, reasonable efforts to reunify are not required; also, in situations such as
"abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse," reasonable efforts are not
compelled. Id. However, it is left up to the states to define such aggravating
circumstances that would alleviate workers from the requirement of reasonable efforts.
44. FosterCare, Child Welfare, andAdoption Reforms: JointHearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the Comm. on
Ways and Means and Select Comm. on Children, Youth andFamilies, 100th Cong. 218-

20 (1988) (statement of Mark A. Hardin, Esq., Director, Foster Care Project, American
Bar Association).
45. See H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 13 (1997), reprintedin 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739,
2745-46.

46. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E) (2000).
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. § 675(5)(C).
Id. § 673(d)(1)(A)-(B).
Id. § 675(5).
Id. Other provisions of this Section require that agencies file a TPR petition

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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dispositional hearing at twelve months, offers children the hope of timely
removal from foster care into a permanent home.5 It also serves to clarify for the
states exactly how long reasonable efforts to reunify families are required and can
provide incentive for parents to work toward case plan goals to enable
reunification within a timely manner.5" ASFA regulations allow states the option
of not filing a petition, even when statutorily mandated, if there are certain
"compelling reasons" not to file.53 An example of a compelling reason that
precludes mandatory filing of a TPR petition is when the state agency has not
provided reasonable efforts to attempt family reunification. 4 ASFA retains the
requirement that "reasonable efforts" be made to reunify, while pairing this with
the requirement that juvenile courts move efficiently and swiftly in determining
the fates of children. ASFA strives to maintain an appropriate balance between
the rights of parents to raise their children without interference, and the rights of
children to obtain a permanent and stable home without being subjected to the
harms of long-term foster care during delicate developmental periods.
IT[. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
After the enactment of ASFA, the Missouri legislature made several
statutory changes in order to comply with the federal legislation.55 The main
changes are found within Chapter 210 on Child Protection and Reformation,
Chapter 211 on Juvenile Courts, and Chapter 453 on Adoption and Foster Care.56
The summer of 2003 marked the five year anniversary of these changes in
Missouri law. As such, now is an appropriate time to review developments
within this area of the law since the enactment of the post-ASFA state statutory
amendments.

when the parent has committed, attempted, or aided and abetted murder or voluntary
manslaughter of another child in the home, or when the child has been adjudicated an
abandoned infant. Id.
51. Id.; see id. § 675(5)(C).
52. Id. § 675(5).
53. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21 (1999).
54. Id. Other reasons can include when the child is being cared for by a relative
or when the state documents other compelling reasons to establish that filing a petition
is not in the child's best interest. Id.
55. See generally Roya R. Hough, Juvenile Law: A Year in Review, 63 Mo. L.
REv. 459 (1998).
56. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 210.001-.937, 211.011-.500, 453.005-.503 (2000).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/8
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A. MissouriLegislation FollowingASFA
In response to ASFA, Missouri modified its statute governing termination
of parental rights.57 Amendments to Section 211.447.2(1) provide that a TPR
petition must be filed by the juvenile office when "[i]nformation available to the
juvenile officer or the division establishes that the child has been in foster care
for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months." 58 Missouri courts
previously held that this sole allegation is sufficient grounds to file a petition to
terminate parental rights.59 In January of 2004, the Missouri Supreme Court
finally decided that the fact that a child has remained in foster care for fifteen
months is not constitutional as a stand-alone ground for termination of parental
rights.60 However, other states' courts have been divided on the issue ofwhether
fifteen months of foster care suffices as a constitutional stand-alone ground for
termination of parental rights, or if other allegations must also be established.6
In order to comply with the federal mandate, Missouri retained the "failure
to rectify" ground for termination of parental rights, located in Section
211.447.4(3).62 This provision of the termination of parental rights statute states

that "[t]he juvenile officer or the division may file a petition to terminate the
parental rights of the child's parent when.. . [t]he child has been under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court for a period of one year," and the office or
division finds that potentially harmful
conditions still exist and are not likely to
63
be rectified in an ascertainable time.
When deciding whether to terminate a parent's rights under Section
211.447.4(3), a court is required to make findings on several factors.6 The initial
factor asks the court to examine "[tlhe terms of a social service plan entered into
by the parent and the division and the extent to which the parties have made

57. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447 (2000).

58. Id. § 211.447.2(1).
59. See J.J.P. v. Greene County Juvenile Office, 113 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2003), abrogatedby In re M.D.R., 124 S.W.3d 469 (Mo. 2004) (en banc); K.C.M.
v. D.M., 85 S.W.3d 682, 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002), abrogatedby In re M.D.R., 124

S.W.3d 469 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
60. In re M.D.R., 124 S.W.3d 469 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
61. See Maryann Zavez, TheAdoption and Safe FamiliesAct: Implementation and
Case Law with a Focus on 15/22 Month Terminations,28 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 37, 39-40

(Mar. 2002). These cases base their determinations on both state and federal
constitutional provisions regarding substantive due process, recognizing that parents'
interests in raising their children without interference are fundamental liberty interests.
See id.

62. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.447, Historical and Statutory Notes, 1998 Legislation.
63. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.4(3) (2000).
64. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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progress in complying with those terms. ''65 The next factor asks for a finding on
"[t]he success or failure of the efforts of the juvenile officer, the division or other
agency to aid the parent on a continuing basis in adjusting his circumstances or
conduct to provide a proper home for the child."" These factors should be
relevant in most hearings due to the requirements of reasonable efforts, which
include providing services and creating a case plan.67
B. Missouri Case Law
In September of 2003, a Greene County circuit court judge declared
Missouri's "mandatory reporter" statute,68 which requires certain professionals
to report suspicions of child abuse or neglect, to be unconstitutionally vague.69
Leslie Ann Brown, a hospital nurse who examined a foster child with suspicious
injuries that could have indicated abuse, was prosecuted for her failure to notify
the child abuse and neglect hotline of the child's injuries.7 ° The law in question
states that when nurses (and certain other persons responsible for the care of
children) have "reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been or may be
subjected to abuse or neglect," they are responsible for immediately reporting
their observations. 7' Although the statute has existed since 1975,7" it had never
faced a constitutional attack as it had not been utilized for prosecution.73 The
appeal is set for oral arguments at the Missouri Supreme Court on May 12,
2004.74 The decision will hopefully provide new clarity to an old law.75

65. Id. "Social service plan" is not defined anywhere within this or any other
Section of the most current version of the Missouri Revised Statutes. However, a "case
plan," as defined by ASFA, is a document which includes "[a] plan for assuring that the
child receives safe and proper care and that services are provided to the parents, child,
and foster parents in order to improve the conditions in the parents' home, facilitate
return of the child to his own safe home or the permanent placement of the child ...
42 U.S.C. § 675 (2000).
66. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.447.4(3) (2000).
67. The remaining factors may not apply in every circumstance. They include
whether the parent has a permanent mental condition, a chemical dependency problem,
or has been convicted of certain felony offenses. Id.
68. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.115 (Supp. 2003).
69. Dismissalof Case Will Bring Clarity, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Sept. 15,
2003, at 5A.
70. Id.
71. Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.115 (Supp. 2003).
72. Id.
73. Id.; see supranote 69.
74. See http://www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf (docket schedule for May 12,
2004).
75. See supra note 69. Prior to the current legislation the hotline system underwent
a state audit, revealing numerous problems with proposals for change that were supposed
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/8
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Adoption of the circuit court's reasoning could impact ASFA-related legislation
because it affects the method by which many children enter into the child
protection system. A narrower mandatory reporting law, however, could prevent
some children from ever entering the child protection system and preclude some
families from receiving services.
In July of 2003, an important decision regarding termination of parental
rights was delivered by the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals."'
In re C.N.G. reversed a termination of parental rights judgment, holding that the
circuit court's determination that a parent failed to rectify harmful conditions was
not supported by adequate evidence." The manner in which the appellate court
explained its decision, however, seems to oppose the policies underlying the TPR
statute and federal law.7"
In C.N.G., the Division of Family Services was notified in April of 2000 that
a mother, M.G.S., was allegedly providing inadequate parenting to her children.79
The person who reported the neglect to the child abuse registry stated that M.G.S.
was abusing prescription medication and leaving her children without proper care
for extended periods of time." ° Her two-year old child, C.N.G., was taken into
protective custody by the Division for placement in foster care."' After C.N.G.
was in foster care for some time, his mother was allowed some unsupervised
visitation with C.N.G."2 However, shortly after unsupervised visits increased,
C.N.G.'s mother relapsed and began abusing prescription medication once
again. The juvenile officer subsequently filed a petition to terminate M.G.S.'s
parental rights on the grounds that C.N.G. had been within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court for over one year, and the mother had failed to rectify harmful
conditions.8 4 The circuit court entered its judgment in favor of termination.85

to be implemented in 2003. State to Verify Abuse Hotline Changes, SPRINGFIELD NEWSLEADER, Feb. 5, 2003, at 3B. Also concerning the reporting statutes, 2003 saw recent

legislation proposed to eliminate the option for non-mandatory reporters to remain
anonymous when calling the hotline. Commission on Children's Justice, Meeting
Minutes (Feb. 10, 2003) (regarding House Bill 396). The apparent intended effect of
disallowing anonymity was to "[e]nd abuse of the child abuse/neglect hotline." Id.
76. In re C.N.G., 109 S.W.3d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).

77. Id. at 710.
78. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
79. C.N.G., 109 S.W.3d at 704. In 2003, the Division of Family Services was split
into two separate divisions and the agency that deals with child abuse and neglect was

renamed the "Children's Division."
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705.
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The court of appeals had an opportunity to examine the "failure to rectify"
ground for termination under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 211.447.4(3). 86
The circuit court's judgment stated that the conditions in Section 211.447.4(3)
existed, and that M.G.S. failed to "substantially comply" with the terms of
numerous agreements entered into by her and the Division of Family Services. 7
The circuit court mentioned several instances in which M.G.S. had been
uncooperative in participating in services that the agency offered. 8 However, the
court of appeals stated that the lower court focused on the wrong issue and failed
to correctly interpret the statute. 9 The appellate court explained that "[t]he issue
is whether or not progress has been made toward complying with the service
agreements-not whether or not the compliance was full or substantial."9
Subsequently, in the final decision, the court of appeals determined that there was
clear, cogent and convincing evidence that M.G.S. was making some progress
on her goals, even if she had neither complied substantially nor actually
completed many of the goals.9" Based on this evidence, the court of appeals
found that there was "neither the persistence of conditions leading to the
assumption of jurisdiction, nor conditions of a potentially harmful nature," and
reversed the parental rights termination.92
The appellate court failed to address a potential alternative ground for
termination of parental rights-that the child had been in foster care for more
than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.9" If the TPR petition had
alleged the time limit as a ground for termination and if the court followed its
own precedent as of the time of decision, the court could have affirmed the

86. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
87. C.N.G., 109 S.W.3d at 706. See Missouri Revised Statutes Section
211.447.4(3), which states:
4. The juvenile officer or the division may file a petition to terminate the
parental rights of the child's parent when it appears that one or more of the
following grounds for termination exist:
(3) The child has been under thejurisdiction of the juvenile court for a period
of one year, and the court finds that the conditions which led to the
assumption ofjurisdiction still persist, or conditions of a potentially harmful
nature continue to exist, that there is little likelihood that those conditions will
be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in
the near future, or the continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly
diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and
permanent home.
88. C.N.G., 109 S.W.3d at 706-07.
89. Id. at 707.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 710.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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termination solely based on this ground.94 It is not clear from the court's opinion
why the fifteen month rule was not addressed, since evidence shows that C.N.G.
remained in foster care from April of 2000 until the filing of the TPR petition in
January of 2002."s Even if the time limit had been alleged in the petition as a
separate ground, however, the court would still be required by statute to
determine if termination of the mother's rights was in the child's best interests.96
The court of appeals never reached the "best interest" determination, and instead
determined that no grounds for termination existed.
IV. DISCUSSION
By enacting the 1998 revisions to the TPR statute to comply with ASFA, the
Missouri legislature intended to provide permanency for foster children as
quickly as possible. 97 The law attempts to balance children's rights with parents'
rights by giving families an adequate chance at reunification. The "failure to
rectify" and "fifteen out of twenty-two months" provisions both focus on the time
limitations of services for family reunification, while still mandating that
reasonable efforts should be made when appropriate." Both of these provisions
of the TPR statute recognize that, even when there have been no severe acts of
abuse or neglect towards a child, the parent may nonetheless lack the necessary
skills to raise a child. 99 The time-limited sections of the TPR statute give child
protection agencies the discretion to determine when such a situation exists in
order to minimize the time a child remains in foster care."° The TPR statute, as
well as other Missouri laws governing adoption, points to a legislative preference

94. See In re K.C.M., 85 S.W.3d 682, 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
95. C.N.G., 109 S.W.3d at 704, 705. Again, it is possible that this ground was
never alleged in the TPR petition; despite prior appellate court decisions that the 15/22
month provision could be a stand-alone ground to terminate a parent's rights, many
juvenile offices and agencies may have felt that this was merely a statutory trigger
requiring a petition to be filed. The lack of clarity in this area of the statute was recently
cleared up by the Missouri Supreme Court, which declared that the 15/22 month
provision is not a stand-alone ground for TPR, but is merely a statutory trigger requiring
filing of a TPR petition after a child has remained in foster care for fifteen months. See
In re M.D.R., 124 S.W.3d 469 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (discussing Mo. REV. STAT. §
211.447.2(1) (2000)).
96. See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.6 (2000); K.C.M., 85 S.W.3d at 694 (remanding
a termination of parental rights judgment, although sufficient grounds were alleged to
prove TPR, due to insufficient findings of whether termination was in the child's best
interests).
97. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.447 (2000).
98. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.2(1), 211.447.4(3) (2000).
99. Id.
100. See Hough, supra note 55, at 465.
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towards state policies that will "promote the best interests and welfare of the
child in recognition of the entitlement of the child to a permanent and
stable home."''
Despite laudable legislative intent, the decision and reasoning of In re
C.N.G. has set a precedent which is detrimental to the legislature's goal of
permanency.° 2 It is important to recognize that the termination timelines contain
a major loophole-the petition does not have to be filed until the child protection
agency determines that "reasonable efforts" toward reunification have
occurred. 0 3 This exception is easy to invoke on appeal, and reversal could occur
in any situation where the services that were offered to the family are found to
fall short of reasonable efforts.'0 4 Another loophole arguably exists under C.N.G.
when a parent is not likely to complete goals in the ascertainable future, but is
nonetheless making some progress toward case goals. Given the lengthy process
of appeals, child protection workers may have to wait until they have other
grounds, lest the child remain in foster care for several years pending a judicial
determination. '° In Missouri, the court's decision in C.N.G. may deter the filing
of a TPR petition at least until fifteen months have gone by, and until still
0 6
undefined "reasonable efforts" have been given to a family.1
The juvenile court's reasoning is not without merit-in determining whether
potential harm to the child exists in the parental home, it makes sense to look at
whether the goals deemed necessary for reunification have been substantially
completed. However, the court of appeals' final decision in C.N.G., by holding
that termination may not be sought even though the child protection agency has
determined that the likelihood of harm exists, could preclude the filing of a
petition based on Section 211.447.4(3), taking all the bite out of this portion of
the statute.0 7 Even in situations where diligent efforts toward reunification have

101. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.005 (2000); Hough, supra note 55, at 465.
102. In re C.N.G., 109 S.W.3d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
103. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 211.447.3 states that even if grounds exist
that would normally mandate the filing of a TPR petition, the child protection agency
does not have to file if:
(1) The child is being cared for by a relative; or
(2) There exists a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition
would not be in the best interest of the child, as documented in the
permanency plan which shall be made available for court review; or
(3) The family of the child has not been provided such services as provided
for in section 211.183.
104. See Celeste Pagano, Adoption and Foster Care, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 242,
247 (1999).
105. For instance, after two appeals of the lower court's judgment terminating
parental rights, C.N.G. had been in foster care for over three years. See C.N.G., 109
S.W.3d 702; In re C.N.G., 89 S.W.3d 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
106. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.2 (2000).
107. Id. § 211.447.4(3)(a).
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been made by the agency, there is still danger of appellate reversal based on
"failure to rectify" grounds.'"3 This could cause children to remain in foster care
longer, subjecting children to psychological harms and other risks."09
Despite various efforts to monitor and improve Missouri's foster care and
child protection scheme, recent years have proven difficult for the system.
Jackson County continues to try to improve its system after facing lawsuits based
on the conditions of foster homes." 0 In 1999, Jackson County received
additional negative press due to the tragic deaths of two siblings that remained
in their parent's care; Division of Family Services employees were blamed for the
deaths due to workers' alleged failure to respond to hotline calls or to investigate
adequately. "' In 2001, a child was shaken to death by his foster father in Greene
County, once again focusing media attention on the poor conditions of foster care
in Missouri." 2
Following such tragic incidents, the news media tend to jump on the failures
of allegedly negligent child protection workers, holding them up as effigies for
critics of the .child protection system.'
Additionally, caseworkers face the
increasing possibility of civil liability, based on the increasing number oflawsuits
alleging negligence for both failure to remove children from abusive parents and
failure to supervise children in foster care.' Risk of lawsuit is another factor
causing extremely poor morale among child protection workers. This risk only
increases the already high rate of worker turnover, which further reduces chances
for stability for foster children.'

108. See id. § 211.447.4(3).
109. See supra notes 26, 39 and accompanying text.
110. See Angela Wilson, New Children's Services DirectorNamed for State,
SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Aug. 27, 2003, at IA.
111. See Sheila Thiele, LetterNot Sufficient GroundsforSuspension,KANSAS CITY
DAILY RECORD, May 6,2002. In 2003 the Division of Family Services was split into two
agencies and renamed; the agency that deals with abused and neglected children is now
called the "Children's Division."
112. RICHARD C. DUNN & FRANK CONLEY, REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN GREENE COUNTY, MISSOURI 1 (Dunn and Judge Conley
wrote this report in response to the request of Governor Bob Holden), available at
http://go.missouri.gov/REPORT OF INVESTIGATION.pdf(last visited Apr. 20,2004).
113. See Matthew Frank, Most Kids Dyingfrom Abuse Are Known to State System;
Caseworkers Visited Some Familiesup to 15 Times, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Feb. 3,
2003, at Al.
114. See Don't Make DFS Mistakes a Crime, Accountability Possible Through
OtherMeans, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Feb. 27, 2003, at 8A.
115. Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It's a HardKnock Life: Does the Adoption and
Safe FamiliesAct of 1997 Adequately Address Problemsin the Child Welfare System?,
39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375, 382-83 (2002).
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A 2003 audit of Missouri's foster care system revealed several disturbing
facts. ' 6 The report showed that caseworkers were too overwhelmed to visit
foster homes regularly, did not comply with federal law in seeking termination
of parental rights in a timely manner, and failed to regularly check almost half of
the foster parents for recent criminal offenses." 7 Therefore, in addition to
psychological damage caused to children who lack permanent homes, the
inability to properly implement the statutes in order to swiftly find permanent
homes for children may actually subject children to risks from within the system.
Missouri needs the funding necessary to hire adequately trained child
protection employees and to provide salaries that will keep these employees from
leaving their positions after a short time. With sufficient training, staff, and
funding, child protection agencies would be capable of providing necessary
services to families. Without additional resources, the child protection and foster
care statutory schemes, regardless of how well planned and potentially useful,
will never be implemented in a manner that brings the spirit of the federal laws
into actual practice.
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, the pendulum of child protection swung too far in the direction
of family preservation, which gave extreme deference to the constitutional
liberties of parents but did little to protect the rights of children. Although the
pendulum has fortunately begun to swing toward child protection and
permanency, the ideal and proposed effects of the current legislation have yet to
come to fruition. Recent budget cuts to Missouri's social service departments are
likely to have serious negative impacts on Missouri's child protection system,
which already struggles to provide sufficient services with the resources currently
allotted." 8
Despite the problems, the positive aspects of the child protection system are
only further reduced by judicial interpretations that impede permanency even in
situations where caseworkers were able to provide reasonable efforts towards
reunification. It is difficult to tell if judges are distrustful that services were
adequate, or if they are merely adhering to prior legislation that focused more on
family reunification than permanency for foster children. Lessons learned from

116. The 2003 foster care audit was completed by State Auditor Claire McCaskill.
OFFICE OF STATE AUDITOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL, PERFORMANCE AUDIT, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES FOSTER CARE PROGRAM (Mar. 18, 2003), available at http://www.

auditor.state.mo.us/press/2003-25.pdf; Matthew Franck, Foster Care Visits FallShort,
Audit Finds, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 19, 2003, at B1.
117. PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 116.
118. Editorial, ResignationsandReform, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 30, 2002,
at B6 (explaining that in 2002, funding for Social Services was subjected to a two percent
budget cut although caseloads had increased by eight percent).
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the not-too-distant past should remind Missourians how erroneous interpretations
of well-meaning laws can diminish children's chances at a permanent and stable
home."'9 In addition to questionable judicial interpretations, the legislature has
provided no additional funding, which is necessary to effect actual systemic
change.
Without additional funding and clear court interpretations that support child
protection policies, Missouri's child protection advocates and workers will have
to continue their struggle to support a system in which services needed surpass
services available. It remains to be seen if the state will be able to do what the
federal legislature intended-to "giv[e] our nation's most vulnerable children
what every child deserves-a safe and permanent home."''2
ALEXA IRENE PEARSON

119. Hearingon Child Welfare Reform Before the Subcomm. on Social Security
and Family Policy of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. (1997), availableat
1997 WL 274386.
120. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement on the
Adoption Bill 11/13/97 (Nov. 19, 1997), available at 1997 WL 718518.
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